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Most of the short texts on the blurb praise the book as diverse. This is not an
exaggeration, to say the least, and it is also no surprise. If the very concept of what
law is all about (Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum cuique tribuendi)
is discussed together with the totality of EU law, a quick systematic approach is
out of reach. For this reason, the book is at the same time enormously thought-
provoking and representing a sort of work in progress which might never be fully
accomplished. There is, however (and unfortunately) also a certain range in the
quality of the contributions. To get an overall idea of their content, it might be helpful
to arrange them in three groups (which might not necessarily coincide with those
shaped by the editors).
First, the search for justice in Europa is an endeavour in philosophy, or, how Neil
Walker, whose article I would choose as a starting point for this aspect, puts it
(p. 447), an effort to discover a “reliable compass of political morality”. The starting
point is the theory of justification developed by Rainer Forst which links the concept
of justice to the idea of justification (see Walker, p. 255), and consequently, to
legitimation. Jürgen Neyer developed this approach further for the purpose of
giving justification to the EU – which, in his view, democracy does not provide and
maybe will never be able to do so. Discussing these ideas is amazing, not only
for the ordinary EU legal scholar, and it is obvious that this discussion is bound to
continue. What is it that gives the EU its very reason of existence? Has any market
logic become dubious – a cantus firmus of the whole book – or is there even some
transcendental content in justice that comes up to the surface (both Kochenov, p.
435 and 436)?
Second, justice is also a concept in positive law. Can a whole polity be just or
unjust? Apparently yes, as the German debate on the Unrechtsstaat (a State where
the idea of justice was systematically absent) shows, a term that designates the
former GDR. There is of course a strong link to the philosophical issue, and there are
some basic decisions to be made at the core of this debate. Can we really say that
there is no issue of justice in the EU because the EU is not a State (a view reported
by Williams, p. 35)? How can EU reform be just (And what does justice really mean
– are we talking about the same when we use the English term justice, the French
equivalent or Gerechtigkeit, justicia, gustizia? Obviously, justice is something
different from the rule of law (again, the German experience underlines this). In a
plurijurisdictional polity such as the EU, it is a most attractive project to sort this out.
A first critical remark may be made here. Article 3 TEU expressly provides that the
Union “shall promote social justice“. I have always wondered what this really means,
and it is pity that the book is rather silent on specific treaty provisions (Article 3 is just
mentioned by Douglas-Scott at p. 55).
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These two extremely interesting aspects are somehow in the shadow of the political
bias apparent in many of the contributions. To be completely clear: Everybody is
free to express his political opinion (what a platitude in a constitutional law blog…).
But in an academic work, some rules of diligence and methodology have to be
respected. It goes without saying that, whatever political view is taken, the content
of legal norms and of cases must be reported correctly – and, sorry, there is no
Member States’ budget control by the ECJ in the sixpack (p. 54; this is really a
mistake – of course I will not mention the author), Article 106 TFEU does not compel
privatisation, but is striking a balance between State- and privately owned forms
of economic governance (p. 167, less a mistake but a question of assessment
– the author here is Nicol), and why should two judgments – Viking and Laval –
signify that the Court took a certain view “notably and notoriously” (Douglas-Scott,
p. 56). And: Which human rights binding at what level are to be applied when
searching for a redistribution of wealth (Williams, p. 49). Further, cross-disciplinary
references must bear some weight; I submit it is not enough just to mention some
statistics in a footnote when stating that the policy fighting the financial crisis did
only create profit for the banks and only losses for the poor (Williams, p. 40), or
just assessing that Europe managed less well than other economies to handle
the crisis (Augenstein, p. 163 – did the authors compare with, let’s say, Japan, or
Latin America?). Economy as a science has something to offer that is more than
statements of “some German conservatives” (Nicol, p. 168). Perhaps the framework
of original common market was not “highly contestable in justice terms”, as Nicol
writes – but just economically reasonable (p. 168)? The book has its weakest parts
when it engages in blunt “austerity bashing”, the “Swabian housewive” being the
virtual target of many contributors (although the real person comes from another
region of Germany). If anyone could clearly detect which parts of the, say, Greek
MoUs were imposed by the Troika and not included by wish of the respective Greek
government, I would easily accept the contrary – but there is no such proof, at least
not in this book. Following this assumption – is all the deplorable social situation
in Greece, but also in Portugal and to some extent in Spain really consequential
upon “austerity”, or not just upon the fact that in 2010, there was no more money
in the purse? What would have happened without supranational co-operation?
“Thankfully this role of academic as defender of the EU faith has been discarded in
some respects, and in the wake oft he Eurozone crisis it deserves to be wholly swept
aside.“, Nicol writes at p. 165.
No, I am afraid, there is at least one left deep in the East-German forests of
Thuringia.
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